Frontiers in Psychology · 1 author, 1 centre
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This narrative review surveys neuroscientific observations—ranging from hemispherectomy cases to basal cognition in brainless organisms—that challenge the assumption that consciousness and cognition are strictly produced by brain activity, arguing instead that the mind-brain identity rests on a correlation-causation fallacy.
This narrative review by a sole author examines multiple lines of neuroscientific and biological evidence that challenge the mind-brain identity theory—the materialist view that consciousness is an emergent epiphenomenon of brain activity. The author argues that while each finding individually might be accommodated within a physicalist framework, collectively they equally support non-physicalist ontologies where consciousness is a fundamental rather than emergent phenomenon. Limitations include that this is a conceptual review relying on selectively cited prior literature without original data, and the author acknowledges that each finding can be reinterpreted within material monism.
